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Abstract
The structure of the telecommunications industry has changed substantially in the last decade,
raising public concern that the quality of our information infrastructure may be adversely
affected. This paper extends the standard vertical differentiation model of imperfect
competition to address the case of the choice of quality in complex systems. In these systems
each demanded good consists of two complementary components whose quality may be set
by competing firms. The extended framework is used to examine how changes in the vertical
and horizontal structure of the industry affect the choice of compatibility, the overall system
quality, the equilibrium market prices, and the allocation of surplus. The results from this
analysis are interpreted in light of changes in the structure of the telecommunications
industry.
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The Quality of Complex Systems and Industry Structure
1. Introduction
Most products may be thought of as complex systems, or networks, composed of sub-
systems and components. This is especially true of many information technology products.
Networks may be physical, as in the case of the telephone, cable television or Internet
communication networks; or they may be logical, as in the case of the different software
modules/layers which must interact to support an application such as word processing, electronic
mail or customer billing.1 The quality of these networks depends on the quality of the
constituent sub-systems. For example, the clarity of a long distance call depends on the qualities
of the telephone sets on both ends, the originating and terminating local exchange networks and
the long distance carrier’s network. Coordinating design and investment decisions to assure
appropriate quality-of-service levels is difficult enough when all of the components are owned
by the same company. What happens when different firms own different parts of the network?
Should we be concerned that changes in industry structure will lead to reductions in the quality
of our information infrastructure?
To answer these questions, we develop a model of quality competition with
complementary components. Each firm produces either or both of two components which must
be combined to create a usable system. For example, the components may include local access
and long distance, computer hardware and software, or a stereo receiver and speakers. We
examine how changes in industry structure affect firms’ pricing and product-design behavior.
Although subject to important caveats, this analysis yields four results which should be of interest
to policy-makers.
1 For a comprehensive discussion of the economics of networks see Economides and White (1994).
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First, network quality and total surplus are higher and prices are lower when there
exists a vertically integrated firm offering a complete system. This suggests that the re-
integration of local and long distance carriers may improve total welfare and incentives to invest
in higher quality telecommunications infrastructure.
Second, effective competition is not sustainable in the face of a bottleneck facility, even
if interconnection is required, unless regulations also control the price of access to the
bottleneck. The introduction of quality competition provides another strategic variable which can
be manipulated by the owner of the bottleneck facility to foreclose downstream competition.2
Third, competition among integrated producers improves total welfare, leading to lower
prices, a larger total market and increased quality/variety available. This suggests that there
will be a social benefit from having multiple integrated carriers offering long distance, cable
television and other information technology services.3
Fourth, once we have two integrated producers competing, there are no gains from
requiring interconnection. The firms will behave so as to deny demand to hybrid system
markets (i.e., systems which are composed of components from two or more firms). Thus,
introducing quality as a decision variable, reverses the results of Matutes and Regibeau (1988,
1992) and Economides (1988, 1989, 1991) that vertically integrated producers will choose to
interconnect their sub-networks so as to offer hybrid systems.
Four features should be considered when interpreting the results of this paper. First, we
assume consumers differ only with respect to their willingness-to-pay for improvements in quality
2 Moreover, the quality of the bottleneck facility sets the maximum system quality which will be available to
consumers. This last point follows directly from our modelling assumption that the quality of a system is never
higher than the quality of the weakest link in the system.
3 Although the simplified approach towards costs in the present analysis precludes determining whether such
competition is feasible (e.g., whether local access services are a natural monopoly), it helps alleviate our concern
regarding the strategic impact of competition on infrastructure quality.
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beyond a minimum quality level. Consumers rank all products identically according to a uni-
dimensional quality index.4
Second, if firms choose to produce identical quality products, then these products will be
perceived by consumers as perfect substitutes and competition will result in marginal cost pricing.
To avoid this, firms will choose to quality-differentiate if they choose to offer products of higher
than the minimum quality.
Third, firms cannot price discriminate among consumers except by manipulating
component versus system prices (i.e., product bundling) and by offering multiple quality levels.
This precludes complex price discrimination strategies such as two-part pricing or volume
discounting (e.g., WATs services).
Fourth, we ignore positive demand externalities (network externalities) that do not arise
as part of the particular mix and match structure that we examine.5 For example, a
telecommunications network exhibits network externalities if consumers typically are willing to
pay more to join a larger network because they have more options of who to call; similarly
consumers may prefer to purchase the more popular hardware platform because more software
is available. Our model excludes network externalities that arise outside the model. However,
interconnection and compatibility which are analyzed in the model may increase the demand of
some components, and this may be considered a network externality. The effect on quality
equilibria of including positive externalities that arise outside our model is ambiguous. It could
either increase or decrease network quality, depending on how customer markets are served.
Addressing this issue is an important topic for future research.
4 The present analysis is inappropriate when such a ranking is impossible. This may occur if consumers measure
quality along multiple dimensions which are not mappable into a unitary index (e.g., they view a comparison of
reliability and customer service as akin to comparing "apples and oranges").
5 See for example Besen and Johnson (1986), David and Greenstein (1990), Economides and White (1994), Farrell
and Saloner (1985, 1986), and Katz and Shapiro (1986).
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The rest of this paper is organized into four sections. Section 2 describes our model, its
relationship to other models in the literature and our solution approach. We proceed by analyzing
how changes in industry structure alter equilibrium solutions in a number of cases. These cases
were chosen both to isolate the effects of specific changes in the regulatory and/or market
environment and to correspond to real world situations where network quality is an issue. The
cases are distinguished by (1) the number of firms, (2) the degree of vertical integration of each
of the firms, (3) whether firms are allowed to price discriminate, and, (4) whether integrated
firms’ components are compatible (i.e., are hybrid systems available?). Section 3 derives the
results by applying the approach outlined in Section 2 to each of the cases summarized in Figure
1. Readers who are more interested in the interpretation of these results may skip this section.
Section 4 interprets our cases in light of the real world, summarizes our four principal
conclusions and suggests opportunities for future research.
2. The Model Set-up
There is a rich literature that analyzes imperfect competition when firms use quality to
differentiate their products.6 Traditional models focus on a market for a single product which
is available at different quality levels. There is a continuum of consumer types who rank the
products identically, but differ in their willingness-to-pay for quality. For example, a
representative consumer of type θ who buys one unit of a product of quality q at price p
receives utility
Uθ(q, p) = θq - p, (1)
or, if the consumer chooses not to purchase a good, she receives her reference utility Uθ0 which
is normalized to zero. When coupled with an assumption regarding the distribution of consumer
6 Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979, 1980), Mussa and Rosen (1978), Shaked and Sutton (1982) among others.
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types, these preferences allow one to compute the demand for each product quality level. For
example, it is common in the literature to assume that consumer types are distributed uniformly
on the unit interval, or
θ~Uniformly on [0, 1]. (2)
Then in a market with a single product of quality q, all consumers of types θ ≥ p/q will
purchase the product thus yielding a demand of 1 - (p/q).
Following Hotelling (1929) and Shaked and Sutton (1982), we model the firms as
competing in a two-stage game. In the first stage, the firms choose quality specifications for their
products, and in the second stage they choose prices (see Figure 2).7 In the second stage, price
competition leads to zero prices whenever both firms’ products are perfect substitutes (i.e., have
identical quality levels). Firms which produce products of different quality may charge different
prices in equilibrium and divide the market. For example, let one firm offers a high quality
product of quality qH at price pH and the other firm offers a low quality product of quality
qL and price pL. Then there will be a marginal consumer with type θL0 who is indifferent
between purchasing the low quality product and no product,
θL0 = pL/qL ∈ [0, 1], (3)
and another consumer with type θHL who is indifferent between purchasing the high or low
quality product,
θHL = (pH - pL)/(qH - qL) ∈ [θL0, 1]. (4)
7 As is typical, we assume perfect information and symmetric production technologies. Consumers know the prices
and qualities of all available products when they make their purchase decisions and firms agree on the nature of
consumer demand and the structure of the strategic game they are playing. Symmetric production technologies assure
that the firms costs are similar which focuses attention on their strategic behavior with respect to product design and
pricing.
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Demand for the high quality product will be 1 - θHL and demand for the low quality product
will be θHL - θL0.8 Non-cooperative equilibrium prices levels p1*(q1, q2), p2*(q1, q2), are
determined in the second stage game as solutions to ∂Π1(p1, p2, q1, q2)/∂p1 = ∂Π2(p1, p2, q1,
q2)/∂p2 = 0. Equilibrium quality levels are found in the first stage of the game as solutions of
dΠ1(p1*(q1, q2), p2*(q1, q2), q1, q2)/dq1 = dΠ2(p1*(q1, q2), p2*(q1, q2), q1, q2)/dq2 = 0.
This framework is useful for analyzing the determination of equilibrium qualities and
prices. It can also be used to determine how changes in industry structure (e.g., entry/exit) affect
firms’ product design (i.e., quality choices) and pricing behavior in equilibrium. We extend this
basic framework of vertical product differentiation by assuming that each demanded composite
good (or system) consists of a network of two components, A and B, with qualities qA and qB.
Consumer preferences are defined with respect to the quality of the composite good, qAB, which
is equal to the minimum of the component qualities:
Uθ(qAB, pAB) = θqAB - pAB (5)
where,
qAB = min(qA, qB) ∈ [0,∞) and Uθ(0, pAB) = 0 (6)
and pAB is the price which the consumer pays for the composite good or system.
If firms’ components are compatible, then it is possible to create a hybrid system by
combining the A component from one firm with the B component from another firm. The price
for this system is equal to the sum of the individual component prices. If a firm is allowed to
price discriminate then it may charge a price for a bundled system (composed of two
components from the same firm) which is different than the sum of the firm’s individual
8 pL must be less than pH or the demand for the low quality product will be zero.
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component prices.9 The regulatory policy known as Open Network Architecture (ONA) prohibits
this form of price discrimination. ONA requires common carriers to offer component pricing
(and hence interconnection via compatible components) which does not discriminate between
hybrid and bundled systems.
We assume that there is an increasing, convex fixed cost associated with improving
quality above the minimal level, but that marginal costs are zero.10 Specifically, we assume that
the cost to a firm of providing component i of quality qi is
C(qi) = qi2/4, where i = A, B. (7)
A firm’s total costs are computed as the sum of the component costs for each component
produced by the firm. Thus, there are scale economies associated with quality but no scope
economies from vertical integration.
A strategy for a firm which produces n components is a choice of qualities for each of
the components in the first stage and a set of prices for each of the components in the second
stage, conditional on all of the firms’ quality choices from the first stage. A solution to this
game consists of a set of equilibrium quality and pricing decisions for each firm. We focus on
subgame perfect Nash equilibria.11
For each of the industry structures described in Figure 1, we determine price-quality
equilibria. The game structure is pictured in Figure 2. In each case, we begin by specifying (1)
9 They may also charge different component prices based on the identity of the firm supplying the complementary
component if there is more than one.
10 This latter assumption could be relaxed if we re-interpret prices as increments above a constant positive marginal
cost.
11 At equilibrium, no firm can increase its profits by altering its behavior unilaterally, given that the other firms are
playing their Nash strategies. Subgame-perfection ensures that the equilibrium is appropriately decentralizable in
any subgame.
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the number of firms and the components each produces, (2) whether price discrimination is
allowed, and (3) whether the firms’ components are compatible (or interconnected). This
determines the range of system products which will be available to consumers. The game is
solved recursively, starting with the competitive pricing equilibrium in the second stage. In order
to obtain a pricing equilibrium when there are multiple products, we need to assume an ordering
of component qualities.12 If a pricing equilibrium does not exist, then the assumed ordering of
product qualities is not part of a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. If we find a pricing
equilibrium, then we substitute this into the firms’ profit functions and solve for a quality
equilibrium for the first stage. A solution to the game, if it exists, is a set of product qualities and
prices which can be used to compute the share of the market served, firm profits and consumer
surplus. Since a firm can always choose to set the quality of every component equal to zero,
profits should always be weakly positive. We can interpret a firm earning zero profits as inactive
in the market. The threat of entry does not constrain the behavior of active firms because these
markets are not contestable (Baumol, Panzar and Willig, 1982).13 This procedure is followed
for each possible ordering of component qualities and for each of the candidate industry
structures identified in Figure 1.14
12 The ordering of component qualities will define an ordering for product qualities. For example (see Section 3.5.2),
with two firms each producing an upstream and downstream product which are compatible, there are four system
products and over 4!=24 possible orderings for the component qualities. Once we know the ordering of product
qualities we can infer consumer demand as a function of prices and qualities and can write down the firms’ profit
functions. The First Order Necessary Conditions (FONCs) obtained when profits are differentiated with respect to
prices identify the pure strategy equilibrium for the second stage.
13 To be active a firm must offer a component with positive quality. Since this incurs a fixed entry cost which is
sunk in the second stage, there is not free entry in the pricing game. This precludes "hit-and-run" entry which, in
any case, seems unlikely in telecommunications.
14 We ignore cases which are only the mirror image of one already considered and dispense with trivial cases in
a sentence or two.
Page 9
3. Analysis of the Model
This section derives the quality and pricing equilibria for each of the cases summarized
in Figure 1. Readers who are not interested in the mathematical derivation of the results, may
proceed directly to discussion in Section 4. The results are summarized in Figures 3 and 4.
3.1.1 Vertically Integrated Monopolist
We first consider a vertically integrated monopolist who produces a single version of
each component, A and B, and sells them as a single product AB. Since consumers care only
about the quality of the composite good, AB, their willingness-to-pay depends on the minimum
of qA and qB. Since there is never a revenue gain associated with increasing a component’s
quality above the highest quality component with which it might be paired and since component
costs increase with quality, we should expect the highest quality upstream and downstream
components to have the same quality in all equilibria. Therefore, the monopolist will choose
identical component qualities q = qA = qB.
Since the monopolist sells a single composite good, price discrimination based on quality
is impossible. Hence, the monopolist will quote a single bundled price, p, for the good AB.
The marginal consumer, θ1, who is indifferent between buying or not buying AB, is defined by
θ1q - p = 0 ⇔ θ1 = p/q (8)
All consumers of types θ ∈ [θ1, 1] will purchase the good; thus the monopolist’s profits are:
Π1(p, q) = p(1 - θ1) - 2(1/4)q2 = p - p2/q - q2/2. (9)
These profits are maximized when the monopolist sets her price at p*(q) = q/2. This implies that
at the first stage, the monopolist will choose quality q to maximize
Π1(p*(q), q) = q/4 - q2/2. (10)
Page 10
The optimal choice for q* is 1/4. This implies that p* = 1/8, θ1 = 1/2 and Π(p*, q*) = 1/32.
Consumer surplus in this case is also 1/32.15
3.1.2 Multiproduct Vertically Integrated Monopolist
The above analysis considered the case of a single product monopolist. We show below
that, given our demand and cost assumptions, the monopolist will not choose to introduce a
second product quality. To see this, consider the situation where the monopolist offers a high
quality upstream/downstream product of quality q1 and price p1, and a second lower-quality
downstream component of quality q2 and price p2. In this case, demands for the high and low
quality systems are 1 - θ1 and θ1 - θ2 respectively, where θ1 = (p1 - p2)/(q1 - q2) and θ2 =
p2/q2. The firm’s profits are
Π1(p, q) = p1(1 - θ1) + p2(θ1 - θ2) - q12/2 - q22/4 (11)
which implies that the optimal second stage prices are p1* = q1/2 and p2* = q2/2.16 At these
prices, the monopolist’s profits are
Π1(p*(q), q) = q1/4 - q12/2 - q22/4. (12)
To maximize these profits, the monopolist should set the quality of the low quality product equal
to zero, q2 = 0. Then the optimal quality of the high quality product is equal to 1/4, as before.
A zero quality product is identical to the outside good. Therefore, the integrated monopolist will
choose not to offer a second quality-differentiated product.
15 Integrating consumer surplus of individual types Uθ(q*, p*) = θq* - p* over [θ1, 1] we get ½(1 - θ12)q* - (1 -
θ1)p* = 1/32 = 0.03125.
16 Substituting for θ1 and θ2 and differentiating (11) with respect to p1 and p2 respectively yields the following
two FONCs: ((q1 - q2) - 2(p1 - p2))/(q1 - q2) = 0 and 2(q2p1 - q1p2)/(q2(q1 - q2)) = 0. Solving these for p1 and p2
yields the indicated solution.
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3.1.3 Socially Optimal Solution
Before analyzing other industry structures, it is worthwhile computing the socially optimal
solution with a single product under a break-even constraint and no price discrimination. This
is obtained by maximizing consumer surplus subject to the constraint that the firm recovers its
costs. The maximization problem to be solved is as follows:
subject to:
Equation (13a) defines total consumer surplus which is equal to total surplus when firm profits
are constrained equal to zero, as in constraint (13b). Constraint (13c) identifies the marginal
consumer with type θ1. Solving (13b) and (13c) for p and q as functions of θ1 yields p =
2θ12(1 - θ1) and q = 2θ1(1 - θ1). After substituting for p and q in (13a), the optimal θ1* is
1/4, which implies that p* = (6/64) 0.094, q* = (3/8) = 0.375, and total surplus is 0.1055. This
is the outcome which maximizes total surplus if the firm is constrained to uniform pricing and
to offering a single product.
If the firm could perfectly price discriminate in order to recover its costs, then the
maximization problem which would define the optimal solution would be:
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Under perfect price discrimination, there is no reason not to serve the entire market and allow
all consumers to enjoy the highest quality product. Therefore, the marginal consumer θ1** will
have type zero, will be charged a zero price; there would be no reason to offer a second, lower
quality product.17 Higher type consumers will pay higher prices. Total surplus is maximized
at q** = 1/4; this results in total surplus of (1/8). In principle, this could be distributed between
the firm and consumers via lump sum transfers according to whatever allocation seemed
desirable.
A comparison of this solution and the single product/uniform pricing solution highlights
the important role which quality-differentiated product lines may play in implementing second
degree price discrimination. It is common for a firm to offer multiple products which are
designed and priced in order to induce customers to self-select so that consumers with a high
willingness-to-pay choose to purchase more expensive products.18 There is a large literature
discussing the design of optimal tariffs to implement this type of second degree price
discrimination which may be based on quality differentiation, volume of purchases or some other
observable attribute which allows customers to be segregated into self-selected groups. Mitchell
17 Since costs do not increase but total surplus does increase when demand increases, it is efficient to price
discriminate so that everyone consumes the highest quality product. Since no one would consume lower quality
products, these should not be produced.
18 From Section 3.1.2, we know that the monopolist does not find this profitable in our model. We did not compute
the socially optimal solution under uniform pricing with multiple products because the incremental gains over the
single product uniform case would be small (i.e., the socially optimal single product/uniform pricing solution already
produces surplus equal to 84% of the level achieved with perfect price discrimination.)
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and Vogelsang (1991) offer an introduction to this literature and its application to
telecommunications.
These two solutions provide benchmarks against which to compare the outcomes under
alternative industry structures. For example, in the absence of perfect price discrimination, the
monopolist sets lower quality (0.25 instead of 0.375), higher prices (0.125 instead of 0.094) and
serves a smaller share of the market (50% instead of 75%), which yields only 59% as much total
surplus (0.0625 instead of 0.1055).
3.2 Bilateral Monopoly: Independent (Non-Integrated) Monopolists Upstream and
Downstream
Consider now the case when each component is produced by a different independent
monopolist. The upstream monopolist produces A and the downstream monopolist produces
B. They are sold at prices pA and pB respectively, so that the composite good AB is
available at price p = pA + pB. By the same reasoning as above, both the upstream and
downstream monopolists will choose to set identical qualities. Therefore, the composite good
has quality q = qA = qB. All consumers with marginal willingness to pay for quality larger than
θ1 = p/q purchase the good. Profits for the two firms are:
ΠA(p, q) = pA(1 - θ1) - q2/4 and ΠB(p, q) = pB(1 - θ1) - q2/4. (15)
Solving the First Order Necessary Conditions (FONCs) for profit maximization for the
second stage, ∂Π1/∂pA = 0 and ∂Π2/∂pB = 0, yields equilibrium prices pA*(q) = pB*(q) = q/3, and
p*(q) = 2q/3.19 When compared to the earlier case of a single integrated monopolist, prices here
are higher for any level of quality. This is because of the double marginalization effects first
19 This symmetric pricing equilibrium is the unique Bertrand pricing equilibrium.
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observed by Cournot (1838). Essentially, each of the independent monopolists is unable to
appropriate the full benefits of a decrease in its own price.20
Anticipating these equilibrium prices, each firm chooses in the first stage the quality of
its component so as to maximize its profits:
Π1(p*(q), q) = Π2(p*(q), q) = q/9 - q2/4. (16)
The non-cooperative equilibrium choice for each firm is to set q* = 2/9, which implies that p*
= 4/27, θ1 = 2/3, and Π1(p*, q*) = Π2(p*, q*) = 1/81. Consumer surplus in this case is also 1/81
( 0.0123).
Compared to the case of integrated monopoly, because of double marginalization, in
bilateral monopoly marginal increases in quality have a bigger impact on price. Being able to
sell the same quality at a higher price than under integrated monopoly, the bilateral monopolists
choose lower quality levels, which are less costly. Despite that, because of double
marginalization, prices are higher than in integrated monopoly, a lower portion of the market is
served, and firms realize lower profits. Consumers also receive lower surplus in comparison to
vertically integrated monopoly. The effects of the lack of vertical integration on price are known.
The interesting result here is that lack of vertical integration (unbundling) leads to a reduction
in quality. Note that this is not because of lack of coordination between the bilateral monopolists
in the choice of quality, since they both choose the same quality level.
3.3 Integrated Firm Facing Competition in One Component
We now consider a duopoly where firm 1 provides end-to-end service, while firm 2
produces only the downstream component. Here, there are two possibilities we must consider:
(1) firm 1 produces two complementary components (A1 and B1) of equal quality, while firm
20 See Economides and Salop (1992) for a discussion of the effects of double marginalization of vertical mergers
under compatibility.
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2 produces product B2 of lower quality; or, (2) firm 1 produces a high quality A1 and a low
quality B1, while firm 2 produces a high quality B2.21 For each of these cases, there are two
additional sub-cases depending on whether we allow firm 1 to price discriminate with respect to
the price of A1 depending on whether it is bundled with B1 or B2.
3.3.1 Integrated Firm Produces Components of the Same Quality
We first consider the case when both of the components (A1 and B1) that are produced
by the integrated firm are of the same quality q1, and are sold at prices w1 and v1
respectively. Firm 2 produces good B2 of quality q2 and sells it at price v2. Since demand
for Firm 2’s good will depend on the min(q1, q2), firm 2 will always choose q2 ≤ q1.
Now, if firm 1 may price discriminate, it can always set the price of w1 to hybrid system
purchasers sufficiently high to foreclose firm 2 from the market. Since monopoly profits are
higher with a single product (as we have shown earlier), firm 1 will choose to foreclose firm 2
and act as a monopolist (as in section 3.1) if it is allowed to price discriminate.
If firm 1 is prevented from price discriminating, then we need to examine two cases.
First, if q2 = q1, the two systems are perfect substitutes and all of the sales will go to the system
with the lower downstream component price, min(v1, v2)). At the pricing stage, this will lead to
marginal cost pricing for the downstream components, or v1 = v2 = 0 which will imply negative
profits for firm 2 for any q2 > 0. Therefore, if firm 2 is to compete, it must choose q2 < q1
and v2 < v1.
With this ordering of qualities, demand for A1B1 is 1 - θ1 and demand for A1B2 is
θ1 - θ2, where θ1 = (v1 - v2)/(q1 - q2) and θ2 = (w1 + v2)/q2. The firms’ profits are:
21 The other possibilities are not viable. If all three qualities are equal then the composite goods have the same
quality which leads to marginal cost pricing and is not an equilibrium. If the upstream component A1 is low
quality, then again, the composite goods will have the same (low) quality.
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Π1 = w1(1 - θ2) + v1(1 - θ1) - q12/2 and Π2 = v2(θ1 - θ2) - q22/4 (17)
The price equilibrium in the last stage is22 w1* = q2/2, v1* = (q1 - q2)/2, and v2* = 0. Therefore,
even if firm 1 is prohibited from price discriminating, firm 1 will price at the second stage so
as to foreclose firm 2 from the market. Anticipating this, the second firm would set its quality
q2* = 0 and the first firm would behave as a single product monopolist (Section 3.1).
3.3.2 Integrated Firm Produces Components of Different Qualities
We now consider the case where the components of firm 1 (A1 and B1) are of different
qualities qA1 and qB1 respectively. Obviously, the bottleneck upstream component must have
the higher quality (i.e., qA1 > qB1). For it to be rational for firm 1 to produce an upstream
component of higher quality, the quality of firm 2’s component, B2, must be higher than the
quality of B1 (i.e., qB2 > qB1). Since there is no gain to either firm from producing higher-than-
necessary quality, qA1 = qB2 = q1 > qB1 = q2.
In the absence of price discrimination, let the prices for A1, B1 and B2 be w1, v1 and
v2 respectively. Thus, there is a high quality hybrid system A1B2 with quality q1 sold at price
w1 + v2, and a low quality bundled system A1B1 with quality q2 sold at price w1 + v1. The
demands for A1B2 and A1B1 are 1 - θ1 and θ1 - θ2 respectively, where
θ1 = (v2 - v1)/(q1 - q2) and θ2 = (w1 + v1 )/q2. The profit functions are:
Π1 = w1(1 - θ2) + v1(θ1 - θ2) - q12/4 - q22/4 (18)
Π2 = v2(1 - θ1) - q12/4.
22 First order conditions are 0 = ∂Π1/∂w1 = 1 - (2w1 + v2)/q2, 0 = ∂Π1/∂v1 = 1 - (2v1 - v2)/(q1 - q2),
0 = ∂Π2/∂v2 = (v1 - 2v2)/(q1 - q2) - (w1 + 2v2)/q2.
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Solving for the equilibrium second stage prices yields23
w1
*
= (2q1 + q2)/6, v1* = (q2 - q1)/3, v2* = (q1 - q2)/3.
This solution implies v1* < 0, which cannot be an equilibrium. Constraining v1* = 0 implies
q2* = 0 as the quality choice. Therefore, this case reduces to the case of two non-integrated
monopolists (Case 3.2).
If we allowed price discrimination, then the above solution implies equilibrium system
prices of w1* + v1* = q2/2 for A1B1 and w1* + v2* = (4q1 - q2)/6 for A1B2. This implies that
θ1 = 2/3 and θ2 = 1/2 regardless of the actual qualities chosen. At these prices, firm profits
are:
Π1(q1, q2) = q1/9 - q12/4 + 5q2/36 - q22/4 and Π2(q1, q2) = (q1 - q2)/9 - q12/4. (19)
Solving the first order necessary conditions24, yields the following equilibrium quality choices:
q1* = 2/9 and q2* = 5/18, which is impossible under the assumptions of the case. As q2
approaches q1, v2* goes to zero and firm 2’s profits become negative. Therefore, regardless of
whether price discrimination is allowed or not, there does not exist a quality equilibrium where
the integrated producer has unequal qualities and is competing against a non-integrated
competitor. Furthermore, this implies that the case of two non-integrated monopolists discussed
in section 3.2 is stable against sequential entry in the form of forward (or backward) integration
by either of the incumbents via a quality-differentiated component.
23 The FONCs are ∂Π1/∂w1 = (q1 - 2(w1 + v1))/q2 = 0, ∂Π1/∂v1 = 2(w1 + v1)/q1 + (2v1 - v2)/(q1 - q2) = 0, and
∂Π2/∂v2 = 1 + (v1 - v2)/(q1 - q2) = 0.
24 The FONCs are ∂Π1/∂q1 = ∂Π2/∂q1 = 1/9 - q1/2 = 0 and ∂Π1/∂q2 = 5/36 - q2/2 = 0.
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3.4 Each of Three Components Produced by a Different Firm
Now consider the case where there are three firms, each producing a single component.
Let firm 1 be the sole producer of the upstream component A1 and let firms 2 and 3 produce
competing versions of the downstream component B2 and B3. Let w1 designate the price of
A1 in the absence of price discrimination; and, when price discrimination is allowed, let w12
and w13 designate the price of A1 when bundled with B2 or B3, respectively. Let v2 and
v3 designate the prices of B2 and B3.
Once again, a moment’s reflection makes it clear that at any equilibrium we must have
qA1 = max(qB2, qB3), since the first firm will increase its costs but not its revenues if it sets its
quality higher than the higher of the two B-component qualities. Without loss of generality, we
may assume that q1 = qA1 = qB2 ≥ qB3. This leaves us with two cases to consider: either qB2
= qB3 or qB2 > qB3. In the former case, the downstream firms’ components are perfect
substitutes and hence the equilibrium prices will be zero, implying that qB2 = qB3 = 0. Firm 1’s
best response is to set qA1 = 0 and no one will purchase anything.
Assuming q1 > qB3, demand for A1B2 is 1 - θ1 and demand for A1B3 is θ1 - θ2
where θ1 = (v2 - v3)/(q1 - qB3) and θ2 = (w1 + v3)/qB3 if price discrimination is prohibited; and
θ1 = (w12 - w13 + v2 - v3)/(q1 - qB3) and θ2 = (w13 + v3)/qB3, if price discrimination is allowed.
In the absence of price discrimination, the profits are
Π1 = w1(1 - θ2) - q12/4 = w1(1 - (w1 + v3)/qB3) - q12/4
Π2 = v2(1 - θ1) - q12/4 = v2(1 - (v2 - v3)/(q1 - qB3)) - q12/4 (20)
Π3 = v3(θ1 - θ2) - qB32/4 = v3((v2 - v3)/(q1 - qB3) - (w1 + v3)/qB3) - qB32/4
which implies that the second stage equilibrium prices are w1* = qB3/2, v2* = (q1 - qB3)/2 and
v3
*
= 0.25 Therefore, the third firm is forced to charge zero price and chooses in the earlier
25 The FONCs are ∂Π1/∂q1 = (qB3 - v3 - 2w1)/qB3 = 0, ∂Π2/∂q1 = (q1 - qB3 - 2v2 + v3)/(q1 - qB3) = 0, and ∂Π3/∂qB3
= (v2qB3 - 2v3q1 - w1(q1 - qB3))/(qB3(q1 - qB3)) = 0.
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stage to produce a quality of level zero. But, this is equivalent to firm 3 dropping out of the
market, since the outside good is of quality level zero. Firms 1 and 2 also anticipate the pricing
equilibrium and see that firm 3 is not a threat to them. Thus, at the first stage, firms 1 and 2
choose the quality levels of bilateral monopoly (section 3.2). The price levels of bilateral
monopoly follow.26 This outcome can be thought of as foreclosure of the potential entrant.
If price discrimination is allowed, however, firm 1’s profits become
Π1 = w12(1 - θ1) + w13(θ1 - θ2) - q12/4 (21)
and the new pricing equilibrium is given by:
w12
*
= q1(3q1 + qB3)/(9q1 - qB3), w13* = 4q1qB3/(9q1 - qB3),
v2
*
= 3q1(q1 - qB3)/(9q1 - qB3), v3* = qB3(q1 - qB3)/(9q1 - qB3).
These prices yield the following first stage profits:
Π1(p*(q), q)= (9q13 + 7q12qB3)/(9q1 - qB3)2 - q12/4,
Π2(p*(q), q) = 9q12(q1 - qB3)/(9q1 - qB3)2 - q12/4, (22)
Π3(p*(q), q) = q1q3(q1 - q3)/(9q1 - qB3)2 - qB32/4.
Solving the first stage FONC, yields equilibrium qualities of q1* = 2/9 = 0.222 and
qB3* = 0.0209.27 This implies θ1* = 0.663, θ2* = .551, w12* = 0.0771, w13* = 0.0093, v2* = 0.06774,
and v3* = 0.0021. Equilibrium profits are 0.01471, 0.01050 and 0.00013 for firms 1, 2 and 3
26 If firms 1 and 2 behave as bilateral monopolists and set their qualities at (2/9) and firm 3 chooses to enter with
a quality greater than zero, firms 1 and 2 will price to foreclose firm 3 from the market; thus the bilateral monopoly
solution is a Nash equilibrium in the three firm game without price discrimination.
27 The FONCs are ∂Π1/∂q1 = q1(162q12 - 729q13 - 54q1qB3 + 243q12qB3 - 28qB32 - 27q1qB32 + qB33)/(2(9q1 - qB3)3) =
0, ∂Π2/∂q1 = q1(162q12 - 729q13 - 54q1qB3 + 243q12qB3 + 36qB32 - 27q1qB32 + qB33)/(2(9q1 - qB3)3) = 0, and ∂Π3/∂qB3
= (18q13 - 34q12qB3 - 729q13qB3 + 243q12qB32 - 27q1qB33 + qB34)/(2(9q1 - qB3)3) = 0. This system of equations was
solved numerically to yield the indicated result.
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respectively, and consumer surplus is 0.0136. This case suggests that in order to sustain
competition in the downstream component, price discrimination must be allowed.
3.5 Duopoly Competition Between Two Vertically Integrated Firms
In all of the previous cases, the upstream component was a bottleneck facility. The
present case considers what happens when we have two integrated firms competing. The
discussion of this case is divided into two major sub-sections. In the first subsection, we
examine what happens when the components are incompatible so interconnection is not possible
and there are no hybrid systems. In the second subsection we assume firms can make their
products compatible and interconnection is feasible. In this section we show that firms will price
so as to foreclose hybrid systems.
3.5.1 Duopoly Competition of Vertically Integrated Firms with Incompatible Components
In this case, there are two systems available. Firm 1 sells system A1B1 of quality q1
for p1 and firm 2 sells the system A2B2 of quality q2 for p2.28 Without loss of generality,
let q1 ≥ q2. Clearly, equal qualities, q1 = q2, will never be chosen because in the price subgame
competition will drive prices to marginal cost. Thus, we confine our attention to the case where
q1 is strictly greater than q2. Demand for A1B1 is 1 - θ1 and demand for A2B2 is θ1 - θ2,
where θ1 = (p1 - p2)/(q1 - q2) and θ2 = p2 /q2. This yields the following profit functions:
Π1 = p1(1 - θ1) - q12/2 and Π2 = p2(θ1 - θ2) - q22/2. (23)
The second stage pricing equilibrium29 is
p1*(q1, q2) = 2q1(q1 - q2)/(4q1 - q2), p2*(q1, q2) = q2(q1 - q2)/(4q1 - q2).
28 Once again, it is obvious that q1 = qA1 = qB1 and q2 = qA2 = qB2.
29 The FONCs are ∂Π1/∂p1 = 0 = 1 - (2p1 - p2)/(q1 - q2) and ∂Π2/∂p2 = 0 = (q2p1 - 2q1p2)/(q2(q1 - q2)).
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Using these prices to compute the first stage profits and then differentiating profits with respect
to quality to get the first order necessary conditions produces a system of fourth order
polynomials which do not have an analytic solution.30 However, these may be solved
numerically, yielding the equilibrium qualities q1* = 0.253 and q2* = 0.048. These qualities
imply p1* = 0.1077, p2* = 0.0103, θ1* = 0.475, θ2* = 0.213. The profits for firm 1 are 0.0244 and
for firm 2 are 0.0015. Consumer surplus is 0.0431.
3.5.2 Duopoly Competition of Integrated Firms That Produce Compatible Components
If the two networks discussed above are interconnected, then the hybrid systems A1B2
and A2B1 may be sold also. This case corresponds to the case where both networks have
adopted compatible technologies so that it is technically feasible to create the hybrid products
and the two networks are interconnected so that the hybrid systems are actually sold. If price
discrimination is allowed, either firm can choose to destroy the market for hybrid systems by
setting the price for unbundled components suitably high. Therefore, pricing behavior may be
used to determine whether components are effectively compatible (i.e., hybrid systems face non-
zero demand in equilibrium).
With four components, there are theoretically over 4!=24 possible quality orders which
we should consider; however, a little thought makes it clear that there are really only 3 cases of
interest. First, even though there are four component qualities to consider and four systems to
choose from (two bundled systems and two hybrid systems), the firms would choose to set the
highest qualities of upstream and downstream components equal, so there would never be more
30 The FONCs are as follows: ∂Π1/∂q1 = (q1(16q12 - 64q13 - 12q1q2 + 48q12q2 + 8q22 - 12q1q22 + q23))/(4q1 - q2)3 = 0,
and ∂Π2/∂q2 = (4q23 - 7q12q2 - 64q13q2 + 48q12q22 - 12q1q23 + q24)/(4q1 - q2)3 = 0.
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than three distinct component qualities in the market place.31 Without loss of generality we may
assume that A1 is the highest quality component. Letting the qualities of A1, B1, A2 and B2
be qA1, qB1, qA2 and qB2, respectively, we assume qA1 ≥ qA2. Moreover, it is obvious that in
any first stage equilibrium, qA1 = max(qB1, qB2). This still leaves us with three possible orderings
for the component qualities to examine:
(i) qA1 = qB1 ≥ qA2 ≥ qB2 (which is the mirror image of qA1 = qB1 ≥ qB2 ≥ qA2)
(ii) qA1 = qA2 ≥ qB1 ≥ qB2 (which is the mirror image of qA1 = qA2 ≥ qB2 ≥ qB1)
(iii) qA1 = qB2 ≥ qB1 ≥ qA2 (which is the mirror image of qA1 = qB2 ≥ qA2 ≥ qB1)
Each of these cases will be discussed both when price discrimination is allowed and when it is
prohibited. If price discrimination is prohibited, let D11, D22, D12 and D21 designate the
demands for the systems A1B1, A2B2, A1B2 and A2B1, and let w1, v1, w2 and v2 designate
the prices for A1, B1, A2, B2. We can write each firms’ second stage profit functions as follows:
Π1 = w1(D11 + D12) + v1(D11 + D21) - qA12/4 - qB12/4, (24)
Π2 = w2(D22 + D21) + v2(D22 + D12) - qA22/4 - qB22/4.
If price discrimination (mixed bundling) is permitted and we let p1 and p2 designate the prices
for A1B1 and A2B2, then the profit functions become:
Π1 = p1D11 + w1D12 + v1D21 - qA12/4 - qB12/4, (25)
Π2 = p2D22 + w2D21 + v2D12 - qA22/4 - qB22/4.
The demand for each system will depend both on the pricing equilibria and on the order
of qualities in each of the cases. Let θ3 designate the consumer who is indifferent between
31 It never makes sense to set the quality of a component higher than the quality of the highest quality component
with which it may be bundled. Therefore, the highest quality A component and the highest quality B component
will have the same quality in any quality equilibrium. If the remaining three components all have different and lower
qualities, combining these components yields at most an additional intermediate and low quality system.
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purchasing nothing and the minimal quality product available, θ2 designate the consumer who is
indifferent between purchasing the minimal and intermediate quality good, and θ1 designate the
consumer who is indifferent between purchasing the intermediate and the highest quality good.
We know that 0 ≤ θ3 ≤ θ2 ≤ θ1 ≤ 1, and that the demand for the highest quality product will be
1 - θ1, the demand for the intermediate quality product will be θ1 - θ2, and the demand for the
lowest quality product will be θ2 - θ3. If we find that θi = θi+1, then demand for the lesser
quality of the two systems is zero.
Case 3.5.2(i) qA1 = qB1 ≥ qA2 ≥ qB2
In this case, we have an integrated high quality firm 1 which is competing against a lower
quality integrated firm 2. Notice that it cannot be an equilibrium for all of the components to
have identical qualities since that would result in zero prices for all components and hence zero
qualities. A deviation where one firm produced higher than zero quality would be privately
rational and hence all zero qualities would not be an equilibrium. Therefore at least one of the
two inequalities must be strict if there is to be an equilibrium with the ordering of component
qualities assumed above.
Clearly, the system A1B1 has the highest quality and the hybrid system A2B1 has either
the same or lower, intermediate, quality depending on whether qA1 = qB1 = qA2 or
qA1 = qB1 > qA2. If the former were true, then components A1 and A2 become perfect
substitutes and the only equilibrium price which could prevail would be zero. This cannot be
part of a subgame-perfect equilibrium since each firm would prefer to lower the quality of its
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component of type A and free-ride on its competitor’s higher quality component of type A.32
Therefore, if there is an equilibrium in this case it must be true that the first inequality is strict.
Assuming that both inequalities are strict, the highest quality product is A1B1, the
intermediate quality good is the hybrid system A2B1, and the lowest quality products are A1B2
and A2B2, which have identical quality, qB2. In the absence of price discrimination, it is obvious
that in any quality-price subgame-perfect equilibrium, the price of a higher quality component
must be (weakly) higher than the price of a lower quality component.33 Therefore the price of
A1 must be greater than the price of A2 and the price of B1 must be greater than the price of
B2. In these circumstances, the second stage profit functions become
Π1 = w1(D11 + D12) + v1(D11 + D21) - qA12/4 - qB12/4
= w1(1 - θ1) + v1(1 - θ2) - qA12/2 (26)
Π2 = w2(D22 + D21) + v2(D22 + D12) - qA12/4 - qB22/4
= w2(θ1 - θ2) + v2(θ2 - θ3) - qA22/4 - qB22/4,
where:
θ1 = (w1 - w2)/(qA1 - qA2), θ2 = (v1 - v2)/(qA2 - qB2), θ3 = (w2 + v2)/qB2.
The first order necessary conditions associated with the second stage pricing equilibrium imply
prices which result in θ1 = θ2, or zero demand for the intermediate quality good in the case
32 It cannot be an equilibrium for qA1 = qA2 = 0 since this implies qB2 = 0 which is not an equilibrium as
discussed earlier. Therefore, the deviation to lower quality by one firm is always possible. This deviation is privately
attractive since the firm’s revenues are unaffected while costs decline. Notice that this is true regardless of the pricing
equilibrium as long as price discrimination is prohibited.
33 Were this not the case, then the lower quality component would face zero demand. For example if v1 < v2 then
sales of B2 would be zero. This could not be a pricing equilibrium since firm 2 could deviate to v2 = v1 - ε and
capture all of the low quality B market, which would weakly improve firm 2’s revenues without affecting its costs.
In any profit maximizing equilibrium of the game, the lower quality (lower cost) firm can always pursue such a
pricing strategy.
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where qA1 = qB1 > qA2 > qB2.34 If this is the pricing equilibrium, then firm 2’s revenues are
unaffected by setting quality for A2 higher than B2, so firm 2 would wish to set qA2 = qB2.
This leaves only one more case to consider, qA1 = qB1 > qA2 = qB2.
With this ordering of component qualities, there are only two system qualities available:
a high quality system produced by firm 1 and three versions of a low quality system (the two
hybrid systems and the bundled system from firm 2). Let H = w1 + v1 be the equilibrium price
for the high quality system and L = min(w1 + v2, w2 + v1, w2 + v2) be the equilibrium price of
the low quality system. Obviously, H > L or we again end up with all zero component
qualities which is not an equilibrium.
We now show that with each firm having two prices to set and with zero marginal costs
(at the second stage), there is no positive component pricing equilibrium. Without loss of
generality, assume w2 ≤ v2. If qA2 > 0, then v2 > 0. In this case, firm 1 would always prefer
to deviate to v†1 = v2 - ε and w1 = H - v†1. However, v1 > 0 and v2 = 0 (implying that
qA2 = qB2 = 0), is not an equilibrium since firm 2 would always prefer to deviate to v†2 = v1 - ε
and w2 = L - v†2. Finally, v1 = v2 is not an equilibrium because this again implies
qA1 = qB1 = qA2 = qB2 = 0. Therefore, there is no pricing equilibrium which can support the above
ordering of qualities if price discrimination is prohibited.
In the second stage, the marginal cost of selling a unit of any quality is zero and so
neither high quality nor low quality firms can commit to not succumbing to the Bertrand
temptation to cut prices to capture additional revenue in the low quality market. Permitting price
discrimination would allow the firms to set unbundled prices sufficiently high to prevent
34 The FONCs are as follows ∂Π1/∂w1 = 1 - (2w1 - w2)/(qA1 - qA2) = 0, ∂Π1/∂v1 = 1 - (2v1 - v2)/(qA2 - qB2) =0,
∂ Π 2 / ∂ w 2 = ( 2 ( w 2 + v 2 ) ) / q B 2 + ( w 1 - 2 w 2 ) / ( q A 1 - q A 2 ) = 0 , ∂ Π 2 / ∂ v 2 = 0 = 1 / q B 2 +
[qB2(2w2 + v1) - 2qA2(w2 + v2)]/(qB2(qA2 - qB2)). The solution of these FONCs yields the following prices:
w1 = [(2qA1)(qA1 - qA2)]/λ, w2 = [qB2(qA1 - qA2)]/λ, v1 = [2qA1(qA2 - qB2)]/λ, and v2 = [2qB2(qA2 - qB2)]/λ, where
λ = 4qA1 - qB2.
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competition from hybrid system products, which would convert this case into the case of
competition between vertically integrated duopolists producing incompatible components.
There is no other equilibrium possible with price discrimination since any case where
there is an active hybrid system market would have at least two products competing which are
perfect substitutes and with three pricing instruments, the equilibrium would be vulnerable to
similar deviations to those described above.
Case 3.5.2(ii) qA1 = qA2 ≥ qB1 ≥ qB2
With this ordering, A1 and A2 have identical qualities and by arguments made
previously, it is clear the firm 1 would also choose to set the same quality for B1, which leaves
us with only one case to consider: qA1 = qB1 = qA2 > qB2. Without price discrimination, we again
have the problem of both firms wishing to free-ride on the other firm’s quality investment in A1
which means that this cannot be an equilibrium ordering.
Case 3.5.2(iii) qA1 = qB2 ≥ qB1 ≥ qA2
Here the highest quality system is the hybrid system A1B2, the intermediate quality
system is A1B1 and the lowest quality system is either A2B2 or A2B1. Following arguments
similar to those above, it is clear that there is no quality/pricing equilibrium with this ordering
which faces non-zero demand.
The above discussion makes it clear that there is no equilibrium with positive demand for
hybrid system products for any of the possible orderings of component qualities. This seems in
contrast with previous results on the choice of compatibility by vertically integrated duopolists.
Matutes and Regibeau (1988, 1992) and Economides (1989) have shown that, for symmetric
demand systems (when the demands for hybrids are equal to the demand for single-producer
composite goods at equal prices), vertically integrated firms prefer compatibility. Economides
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(1988, 1991) has shown that this result can be reversed if the demand for hybrids is small relative
to the demand of the own system. This is because compatibility increases demand but also
increases competition. Thus, a firm that faces a small hybrid demand (relative to the demand of
the own system) does not get rewarded sufficiently in terms of demand for the increased
competition brought by compatibility and therefore prefers incompatibility. In the model of this
paper, the demand for hybrids depends on the quality choices of all four components. Because
the quality of a composite good is the minimum of the qualities of its component parts, any
quality configuration where the components of each vertically integrated firm have the same
quality level but this quality level is different than the common quality of the components of the
opponent (qA1 = qB1 > qA2 = qB2) will lead both firms to desire incompatibility. In such a case,
in the price stage, the hybrid does not give enough demand reward to the low-quality producer,
who therefore chooses incompatibility. In a case where an integrated firm produces components
of different qualities (e.g., qA1 = qB1 > qA2 > qB2), in the pricing stage firms have an incentive to
choose compatibility non-cooperatively. However, at the earlier quality stage, the firm that was
assumed to produce different qualities has an incentive to equalize its quality levels downward.
This move leads the market to the earlier case (qA1 = qB1 > qA2 = qB2) where compatibility is not
desirable from each firm’s point of view. In summary, given certain quality levels, compatibility
is desirable as in the previous literature. However, allowing the firms to choose their quality
levels drives them toward the market structures where compatibility is undesirable to them.35
Essentially the drive of integrated firms to achieve a uniform quality of all their components
while differentiating their quality from that of opponents squeezes out the demand for hybrids
and drives firms to incompatibility and lack of interconnection.
35 This open the possibility that allowing firms to endogenously choose their quality or variety levels may reverse
the compatibility results of Matutes and Regibeau (1988, 1992) and Economides (1989) in general. This could
happen if firms choose variety or quality levels that lead to configurations where the demand for hybrids is small,
so that compatibility is undesirable as in Economides (1989, 1991).
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4. Implications for the Telecommunications Industry
The history of the Public Switched Telecommunications Network (PSTN) provides a
useful vehicle for interpreting the results derived in the preceding sections. As the PSTN evolves
into a mixed, hybrid system of public and private facilities, firms’ strategic incentives will
change. The forces which are altering the PSTN are quite complex. They include technological
progress, globalization and deregulation. For example, advances in fiber optics, digital switching
and software control are reducing costs and creating new product opportunities. Increased
internationalization has encouraged multinational alliances while deregulation is permitting new
types of entry. Our model addresses these forces indirectly by examining how changes in the
ownership structure of network components and selected regulatory reforms (e.g., ONA pricing
and interconnection requirements) change firms’ strategic behavior with respect to pricing and
product design, which is interpreted as choosing the quality for network services.
The cases summarized in Tables 3 and 4 reflect static equilibria which ignore such
important real world issues as multi-part tariffs (i.e., separate fees for access and usage), volume
discounting to discriminate between residential and commercial customers (e.g., WATS), and
special access or custom-designed virtual private network services. Most importantly, we ignore
the effects of rate of return regulation.36 These omissions are intentional. We believe that
telecommunications is moving fast in a completely deregulated environment, and it is this
environment that now needs to be studied. Thus, we focus attention on non-cooperative
equilibria in prices and quality levels and examined changes in ownership structure, isolated from
the possibly distorting influences of technological change, regulatory politics and dynamic
investment planning. Therefore, the analogies drawn between the real world situation and the
cases are intended to be suggestive rather than exact. However, we believe that our analysis is
36 Rate of return regulation may encourage excessive investments in quality if quality improvements are capital
intensive (Averch and Johnson, 1962), which seems plausible (e.g., redundant electronics to improve reliability,
excess channel capacity to reduce blockage, or additional software features).
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closer to the near future state of affairs in telecommunications than an analysis based on
regulation would be. With this proviso in mind, let us interpret our results in light of current and
prospective changes in the structure of the U.S. telecommunications industry.
The first case we considered (Section 3.1) was the vertically integrated monopolist. This
is our base case and corresponds loosely to the pre-divestiture world of AT&T’s Bell System,
where a single firm provided end-to-end Plain Old Telephone Service (POTS) of a uniform
quality as its principal activity. Compared to the socially efficient solution (Section 3.1.3), a
monopolist sets higher prices, offers lower quality and serves a smaller share of the market,
yielding approximately half the socially-efficient level of surplus.37 The avowed intention of
rate of return regulation was to help correct this inefficiency. Unfortunately, regulation is costly
and introduces its own distortions.
The divestiture of AT&T was intended to improve total surplus by encouraging
competition in the long distance markets. The initial effects of divestiture are captured by a
comparison of the first case with the case of bilateral monopolists (Section 3.2). Compared to
an integrated monopolist, marginal increases in quality have a bigger impact on price. As a
result, firms choose lower quality levels, serve a smaller portion of the market, and realize lower
profits despite the higher prices. Consumer surplus is lower also, implying that in this model,
divestiture reduces total welfare and has a negative impact on service quality.
At the time of divesture, AT&T no longer had a monopoly over long distance service.
Indeed, the emergence of alternative interexchange carriers such as MCI in the 1970s helped
provide the impetus to force the divestiture of long distance and local exchange services. The
case of three firms discussed in Section 3.2 captures the impact of combining divestiture with
increased competition in one of the service markets. If price discrimination is permitted,
37 From Table 4, total surplus under a vertically integrated monopolist is 0.063, which is 59% of the socially
efficient level of 0.106 (if we are constrained to uniform pricing) and 50% of the overall efficient level of 0.125 (if
perfect discrimination is feasible).
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competition offers an improvement relative to bilateral monopoly, but still falls short of the
original vertically integrated monopoly outcome.38
If price discrimination is prohibited, an equilibrium with three firms is not sustainable.
Two of the firms act to foreclose the third firm. If price discrimination is allowed, however, the
firm which controls the bottleneck facility (i.e., the local exchange carrier in the present
discussion), finds it advantageous to price so as to encourage entry of another downstream firm.
This result suggests that ONA pricing by the local exchange carrier, in the absence of price
regulations, would reduce total efficiency. It highlights the close linkage between price
discrimination requirements, compatibility standards, quality choices, and the vertical structure
of firms in the industry.
Prior to divestiture, AT&T faced competition from non-integrated long distance carriers
such as MCI. MCI originally competed against AT&T with a lower quality network and had to
sue AT&T for access to its local exchange services.39 MCI won its suit. The analysis of the
case discussed in Section 3.3.1 shows that competition by a lower quality, non-integrated carrier
is not sustainable regardless of whether interconnection (compatibility) is required or whether
price discrimination is prohibited (i.e., AT&T was required to price as a common carrier).
Today, the local exchange carriers are agitating for regulatory reforms which would permit
the re-integration of local and long distance services.40 As long as they maintain an effective
monopoly over local access services, it may be necessary to regulate access pricing if non-
integrated competitors are to survive.
38 From Figure #3, Firm #1’s profits increase from 0.01235, under the bilateral monopoly solution, to 0.0244
(Section 3.4 with discrimination).
39 MCI’s network was initially smaller and its access connections were of lower quality than those of AT&T.
40 The separation of local and long distance services is required by the Modified Final Judgement which is the
consent decree between AT&T and the Justice Department governing the divestiture terms.
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The second case of non-integrated competition (Section 3.3.2) involves an integrated firm
with both a high quality bottleneck and a low quality sub-network competing against a non-
integrated high quality firm. Here, competition is sustainable only if price discrimination is
prohibited, but the outcome is worse than under the monopoly case (i.e., the solution defaults to
the bilateral monopoly result). Such a situation might arise if a long distance company attempted
to enter local access competition via an alliance with a cable company, an alternative access
provider such as Teleport or MFS, or via cellular access (e.g., McCaw and AT&T). At least
initially, we might expect the extent of facilities and the coordination of interconnection to result
in the Bell Operating Company being perceived as offering higher quality access facilities.
The results considered above assume the existence of a bottleneck facility. What happens
if there are two integrated firms competing as quality-differentiated duopolists? For example,
imagine the situation where AT&T integrated forward into local exchange services via cellular
or cable TV access while the local exchange carrier simultaneously integrated backward into long
distance services. The alliances between Bell-Atlantic and TCI, Time Warner and US West, MCI
and Teleport, AT&T and McCaw Cellular, etc. suggest that this may be the mode of competition
in the future. Fortuitously, the results presented in Section 3.2.1 indicate that this will produce
an outcome which out-performs the integrated monopolist. It is noteworthy that this is the only
industry structure which out-performs the original pre-divestiture model and that even this
solution falls far short of the socially optimal level of total surplus (i.e., total surplus with
integrated duopolists is 0.069 versus 0.1055). Thus, even with duopoly competition in every
market, continued regulation may be justified. Moreover, our results assume that the production
costs are such that duopoly competition is sustainable (i.e., local access is not a natural
monopoly).
Our model indicates that there are no gains from offering hybrid systems. The integrated
firms will price so as to foreclose these markets. This may be unfortunate since other reasons
to interconnect might exist. For example, active hybrid system markets may be useful in helping
Page 32
to assure network reliability (i.e., hybrid systems offer alternative routing options in the event one
of the sub-networks fails). However, since real networks are unlikely to perfectly overlap the
opportunity to reach additional customers will help encourage interconnection.
5. Concluding Remarks
Although the preceding discussion attempted to interpret our analytic results in terms of
policy questions which are of interest to telecommunications regulators, we should not forget that
this is an abstract model. Its real contribution may be in expanding our understanding of the
theoretical tools which underlie economic-based policy analysis. We were somewhat surprised
to find that the standard models were inadequate for addressing the questions posed by the
evolution towards a more highly decentralized information infrastructure.
Much work needs to be done if we are to understand the effects of changing industry
structure on incentives to invest in quality. For example, two important theoretical extensions
to the present work include (1) accounting for the effect of positive externalities on quality
investments, and (2) incorporating imperfect, asymmetric information. In addition to these
theoretical extensions, we need additional empirical work which addresses how the quality of our
infrastructure has changed since divestiture.
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